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28 October 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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


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
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***USSR:** Khrushchev's 27 October letter to President Kennedy, which was immediately published, constitutes Moscow's first specific proposal for a negotiated settlement of the Cuban crisis.

His call for reciprocal Soviet-US withdrawals of offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey, under international supervision, and for mutual non-aggression guarantees covering these countries was designed to encourage U Thant to intensify his mediatory efforts and to stimulate other UN members to increase pressure on the US for a compromise formula. Khrushchev expressed the belief that it is possible "to end the conflict quickly" and that his proposal provides the "basis for a settlement."

Moscow probably will make further proposals calculated to deter US military action against the missile sites or, failing this, to make such action as costly as possible in political terms. The 27 October bid for an exchange of commitments regarding Turkey and Cuba probably represents Moscow's maximum position.

The USSR's next step may be to reduce these demands to a US guarantee not to attack Cuba and to respect Cuban sovereignty in exchange for a Soviet commitment to cease work on the missile sites and eventually to remove them under some form of international inspection.

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*Cuba--UN: In the UN on 27 October, there was considerable fear that the US would invade Cuba, and talks continued between U Thant and the chief delegates of the US, USSR, and Cuba. Fidel Castro replied to U Thant's letter of 26 October, which proposed the suspension of construction of MRBM and IRBM bases during the period of negotiations. Castro said he would accept the proposal provided that "the US Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba, including the naval blockade of our country."

Castro also invited U Thant to come to Cuba to discuss the crisis, "should you consider it useful to the cause of peace." A UN spokesman said late on the 27th that U Thant would decide soon whether to accept, "but not tonight."

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa was expected to arrive in New York on 28 October to talk with Thant, possibly to establish the terms of reference for a visit to Cuba by the Acting Secretary General.

U Thant believes that the basic cause of the whole situation is Cuba's fear of US invasion. His short-circuit solution to the problem is a US guarantee not to invade Cuba.

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*Cuba--Non-Bloc Developments: (Despite the cool reception given by the United States, Turkey, and Great Britain to Khrushchev's 27 October proposal to neutralize Turkish missile bases in exchange for dismantling Cuban ones, the idea of some such exchange seems likely to linger in the minds of non-aligned Asian and African nations as a reasonable solution to the Cuban problem.)

(Khrushchev's proposal apparently took advantage of thoughts and suggestions made some time earlier by)

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(such individuals as Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky and Ghana's Ambassador to the UN Quaison-Sackey.

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(Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin, echoing President Kennedy, said on 27 October that "Turkey cannot be the subject of bargaining on this matter" at this time. In addition, British officials supported President Kennedy's stand.)

(Nevertheless, the tendency of "neutral" nations to seek a quid pro quo in reaching compromise solutions is likely to produce additional suggestions along these lines. The first indirect Soviet bloc commentary from Budapest indicating "bitter disappointment" over President Kennedy's "almost immediate" rejection of Khrushchev's proposal and his apparent disinterest in negotiating on "reasonable terms," may spur would-be mediators into action.)

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*Cuba--Latin American Developments: Venezuela on 27 October became the first Latin American country to order full-scale mobilization of its armed forces. President Betancourt, long a leading proponent of action against Castro, wants "to put an end once and for all" to the Cuban threat. Venezuela will probably contribute forces to be used in the quarantine or other actions against Cuba but has urged that military measures come under OAS command.

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Brazil's President Goulart, in a 25 October reply to President Kennedy's letter, adamantly reconfirms

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his country's opposition to military measures against Cuba other than the quarantine. On 27 October, Bolivia also officially declared its adherence to the principles of "non-intervention and self-determination" in the Cuban case, but did endorse the OAS vote calling for the use of force if necessary to maintain the "blockade."

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

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COMMUNIST CHINA - INDIA BORDER AREA



*India - Communist China: (Peiping is mounting a diplomatic offensive designed to put pressure on New Delhi to accept disengagement along the border and a negotiated settlement on Chinese terms.)

(The Chinese apparently are trying to play down their continued military advances by making a show of peaceful intentions.)

(Chou En-lai, in replying to a mediation offer by Nasir, has urged the UAR to exert its influence on behalf of the 24 October Chinese proposals for a 12-mile mutual withdrawal and top-level talks. Chou has dispatched similar notes to several Afro-Asian neutralist leaders.)

(In a 27 October editorial in People's Daily, Peiping clearly indicated that in the northeastern sector of the border it is willing to withdraw behind the McMahon line. The Chinese, however, reject Nehru's insistence on reverting to the situation that prevailed in early September as a condition for negotiations.)

(The military situation is becoming less clear. The Indians apparently are continuing to hold at Chushul in Ladakh and Walong in the Northeast Frontier Agency, but are falling back in the central and western sectors of NEFA.)

(Nehru is assuming closer personal control over government actions. Some shift in authority and functions in the defense field is likely, and may already be underway. Defense Minister Krishna Menon's power and influence are almost certain to be curtailed. However, Nehru probably will continue to resist pressures to form a "national government" or to dismiss Menon.)

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(Moscow's support of Peiping's "peace proposals" has greatly embarrassed the Indian Communist Party (CPI). During the past year the CPI's Moscow-oriented moderate leaders have moved the party toward a more nationalistic stance regarding the Chinese.)

(The latest issue of the CPI's weekly New Age supported the government's rejection of Peiping's proposals and termed Chinese actions on the border "an act of invasion." Some leaders of the party's vocal pro-Chinese faction fear that they will be imprisoned under New Delhi's newly assumed emergency powers.)

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